

CHALLENGES TO ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS IN SOUTH ASIA: POLITICAL PATRONAGE AS AN OBSTACLE TO TRANSPARENT GOVERNANCE IN INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND BANGLADESH

Qualitative Study

Zain Ahmed^{1*}

¹Faculty of Social Science, National Research University, Higher School of Economics (HSE University), Moscow, Russia.

Corresponding Author: Zain Ahmed, Faculty of Social Science, National Research University, Higher School of Economics (HSE University), Moscow, Russia.
zainahmed000@gmail.com

Conflict of Interest: None

Grant Support & Financial Support: None

Acknowledgment: The author extend his gratitude to all researchers, analysts, and institutions whose work contributed to the understanding of political patronage and governance dynamics in South Asia.

ABSTRACT

Background: Political patronage, characterized by the allocation of state resources, jobs, and contracts in exchange for political loyalty, remains a persistent challenge to governance in South Asia. Rooted in historical governance structures, patronage has evolved from the Mughal-era Mansabdari system to a tool of electoral manipulation in modern political frameworks. In India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, clientelistic networks undermine institutional integrity, erode public trust, and facilitate large-scale corruption. Despite anti-corruption measures, patronage remains a dominant force in political decision-making, obstructing governance reforms and democratic accountability.

Objective: This study aims to examine the mechanisms of political patronage in South Asia, assess its impact on governance and corruption, and analyze contemporary high-profile cases to illustrate its entrenched role in political systems.

Methods: A qualitative research design was employed, utilizing secondary data from investigative reports, parliamentary records, judicial proceedings, and academic literature. The study incorporated a theoretical framework of clientelism to interpret the findings. Case selection criteria included the prominence of corruption cases, financial magnitude, and documented political involvement. Three case studies were analyzed: the Adani scandal (India, \$250M bribe allegations), the fake accounts money laundering case (Pakistan, \$5B misappropriation), and the Rooppur Nuclear Power Project fraud (Bangladesh, \$5B embezzlement). Thematic analysis was conducted to identify key trends in patronage networks, corruption mechanisms, and governance failures.

Results: The findings trace political patronage from historical origins to contemporary governance structures, revealing a systematic pattern of favoritism and financial mismanagement. In India, allegations indicate that the Adani Group acquired 1,552 hectares of public land at undervalued prices and won six major airport privatization bids under politically favorable conditions. In Pakistan, judicial investigations exposed 29 fraudulent accounts linked to high-ranking officials, revealing \$10.2B in suspicious transactions. In Bangladesh, corruption allegations against the former prime minister involved \$5B in financial irregularities, leading to political instability and her eventual resignation. These findings underscore how patronage weakens institutional autonomy, fuels political instability, and obstructs economic progress.

Conclusion: Political patronage remains deeply embedded in South Asia's governance systems, obstructing transparency, meritocracy, and institutional reform. Addressing this issue requires the strengthening of independent anti-corruption bodies, enhanced transparency in campaign financing, and comprehensive socio-economic reforms. Civil society and media oversight must be reinforced to expose and counteract patron-client networks, ensuring democratic accountability and sustainable governance.

Keywords: Corruption, governance, India, institutional reform, Pakistan, political patronage, transparency.

INTRODUCTION

Political patronage poses a significant challenge to anti-corruption efforts in South Asia, particularly in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, where it undermines transparent governance. Defined as the allocation of jobs, favors, or resources in exchange for political support, patronage is deeply embedded in the region's political systems, often influencing decision-making at various levels of governance. While political competition is an inherent part of any democratic system, the entrenchment of patronage networks leads to the prioritization of personal or group interests over national welfare, resulting in weakened institutions and diminished public trust. This study seeks to examine the nature of political patronage and its impact on governance, particularly how it obstructs anti-corruption initiatives in these countries. Political theorists, including Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli, have long emphasized that the struggle for power is a natural aspect of human society, driven by the inherent desire to dominate or secure authority (1,2). Hobbes, in *Leviathan*, asserts that without a central authority, society descends into chaos, necessitating the establishment of political institutions. Once in place, however, these institutions become arenas for continuous power struggles, a concept further explored by elite theorists such as Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, who argue that elites perpetually rotate in and out of power, ensuring that governance remains a contested space (3,4). While such struggles can promote competition and institutional development, they also create opportunities for patronage when political actors prioritize loyalty and self-preservation over meritocracy and good governance.

The interplay between political struggles and patronage is particularly concerning when it fosters institutional decay. While democratic theorists like Robert Dahl argue that pluralism ensures power is distributed across various groups, preventing tyranny and fostering representation (5), excessive patronage erodes these democratic safeguards. The process by which political actors distribute jobs and resources to their loyalists in exchange for electoral support not only entrenches nepotism but also weakens accountability mechanisms. Consequently, rather than serving the public interest, state institutions become tools for political consolidation, hindering efforts to combat corruption and implement transparent governance reforms. The detrimental effects of patronage are further emphasized by scholars such as Karl Marx and Max Weber. Marxist theory critiques power structures that enable ruling elites to prioritize their own class interests at the expense of broader societal welfare, perpetuating systemic inequality (6). Similarly, Weber's analysis of bureaucracy warns that when institutional structures serve political elites rather than the public, they contribute to stagnation and alienation, reducing the state's capacity to address pressing issues such as economic inequality and climate change (7). In modern contexts, Francis Fukuyama's work highlights the risks of political decay, where institutions fail to adapt due to entrenched patronage networks that resist necessary reforms (8). In South Asia, where governance is often shaped by dynastic politics and patron-client relationships, the persistence of patronage has led to policy paralysis, inefficiency, and widespread disillusionment among citizens.

Political actors often campaign on promises of prioritizing national interests, yet once in power, many engage in patronage practices that betray public trust. This transformation of political competition into a system of favoritism undermines the very foundations of democracy and governance. When institutions are staffed based on political loyalty rather than competence, the effectiveness of public services declines, corruption proliferates, and reforms become difficult to implement. The erosion of institutional integrity ultimately exacerbates socio-political instability, making governance less responsive to public needs and increasing resistance to anti-corruption efforts. This study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of how political patronage functions as a barrier to transparent governance in South Asia, with a particular focus on India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. By examining historical patterns, institutional weaknesses, and contemporary case studies, this research will highlight the mechanisms through which patronage perpetuates corruption and weakens democratic institutions. The objective is to contribute to a nuanced understanding of political patronage's role in governance, offering insights into potential reforms that could enhance institutional accountability and reduce the prevalence of corruption in these nations.

METHODS

This study employed a qualitative research design, utilizing secondary data sources to analyze the phenomenon of political patronage and its impact on governance in South Asia. Data were collected from investigative reports, parliamentary records, judicial proceedings, and journalistic investigations to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. The study focused on recent high-profile corruption cases in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, providing empirical illustrations of how patronage networks operate within these political systems. The inclusion criteria for case selection were based on the prominence of corruption cases, their impact on governance structures, and the availability of credible documentation, while cases lacking sufficient verifiable data were excluded. A theoretical framework of clientelism was adopted to interpret the findings, conceptualizing the relationship between political leaders and their supporters through reciprocal exchanges of resources and favors. This approach facilitated an in-depth examination of how political elites consolidate power by distributing benefits to loyalists, often at the expense of institutional integrity and democratic governance.

Data sources included official government reports, legislative debates, court rulings, peer-reviewed academic literature, and investigative journalism to ensure credibility and relevance. A systematic review of these materials was conducted to identify patterns of patronage, mechanisms of corruption, and their broader implications for governance.

Data were analyzed using thematic analysis, with key themes identified based on recurring patterns in the collected sources. The analytical process involved coding relevant excerpts, categorizing them into broader themes such as institutional manipulation, electoral influence, and bureaucratic favoritism, and drawing connections between them. The study maintained a rigorous approach to data verification, cross-referencing information from multiple sources to mitigate bias and enhance reliability. Given the qualitative nature of the research, no statistical tests were applied; however, a comparative analysis across the three selected countries was conducted to highlight commonalities and differences in patronage practices. Ethical considerations were addressed by ensuring that all data were sourced from publicly available documents and previously published research. No direct interaction with human participants was undertaken, thereby exempting the study from requiring formal institutional review board (IRB) approval. Nevertheless, ethical guidelines were adhered to by maintaining objectivity, ensuring accurate representation of data, and acknowledging all sources appropriately. Informed consent was not applicable due to the exclusive reliance on secondary data.

RESULTS

Origins of Political Patronage in South Asia

Political patronage in South Asia has evolved over centuries, adapting to different governance structures. The findings indicate that patronage was formalized during the Mughal era, institutionalized under British colonial rule, and later transformed into a political tool in post-colonial states. During the Pre-Colonial Period, patronage was evident in the Mansabdari System, where nobles were granted administrative positions and agricultural estates in return for military and bureaucratic service. Similarly, the Zamindari System established a patron-client relationship between landlords and peasants, fostering economic dependency (9). In the Colonial Period, the British East India Company strategically utilized patronage to secure the loyalty of local elites. The Permanent Settlement of 1793 institutionalized a hereditary landlord class. Under direct British rule (1858-1947), the Indian Civil Services (ICS) provided administrative positions to Indians who demonstrated loyalty, reinforcing colonial control (10). Patronage also played a divisive role, as divide-and-rule strategies encouraged sectarian conflicts to weaken opposition movements (11). Following independence, the Post-Colonial Period saw the transformation of patronage into an electoral strategy. In India, the abolition of the Zamindari system in 1951 shifted patronage to political parties, where resource distribution was used to secure votes (12). In Pakistan, feudal landowners (Waderas) played a key role in distributing government jobs and political favors in exchange for electoral loyalty (13). Similarly, in Bangladesh, post-independence patronage revolved around political parties rewarding loyalists with government contracts and benefits, particularly favoring families that supported the independence movement (14).

Case Studies of Political Patronage

Three contemporary case studies illustrate the mechanisms and impact of political patronage in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

1. India: Gautam Adani and Political Favoritism

The relationship between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and businessman Gautam Adani has raised concerns regarding corporate favoritism. The Hindenburg Report (2023) alleged financial irregularities and corruption amounting to \$250 million (15), implicating Adani in fraudulent business practices. Further analysis indicated that Adani Group acquired land in Gujarat at a rate 300 times lower than market value, while gaining preferential access to government contracts, including a 1,552-hectare land deal for the Mundra Special Economic Zone (16). Additionally, the privatization of six major airports in 2018 was controversially structured to favor the Adani Group (17).

2. Pakistan: Fake Accounts and Money Laundering Scandal

A Joint Investigation Team (JIT) in 2018 uncovered a \$5 billion money laundering network linked to former President Asif Ali Zardari and the Omni Group. Investigators found 29 fraudulent accounts used to channel funds, with Rs10.2 billion directly transferred from Bahria Town's accounts. Additionally, Rs53.4 billion in loans were misused through political connections (18). Despite these findings, legal proceedings were stalled, and in 2024, Zardari was re-elected as Pakistan's president, granting him constitutional immunity (19).

3. Bangladesh: Sheikh Hasina's Corruption Allegations

In 2024, allegations surfaced against former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, her son, and niece, accusing them of embezzling \$5 billion from the Rooppur Nuclear Power Project through offshore accounts (20). The scandal expanded to include irregularities in public procurement and land allocation. Protests against Hasina's governance intensified after accusations of suppressing opposition and favoritism in public job quotas, ultimately leading to her resignation in August 2024 (21).

Theoretical Framework: Clientelism in Political Evolution

Clientelism, a system of reciprocal exchanges between political figures and supporters, was used as the analytical framework. The findings indicate that clientelism evolved in two major ways:

1. **Political Integration:** Traditional patron-client relationships became embedded in modern state institutions, ensuring electoral success through strategic resource distribution.
2. **Obstruction of Transparent Governance:** Patronage facilitated political dominance but simultaneously weakened institutional efficiency and obstructed anti-corruption efforts.


In South Asia, contemporary clientelism manifests through weak civic culture, institutional capture, and political favoritism, reinforcing cycles of corruption and undermining governance structures.

Table 1: Summary of Political Patronage Systems

Period	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh
Pre-Colonial	Mansabdari, Zamindari	Feudalism	Local Leadership
Colonial	ICS, Landlord Loyalty	British Institutional Influence	British Support to Rulers
Post-Colonial	Party-based Patronage	Ethnic & Feudal Patronage	Party-based Patronage

Table 2: Key Corruption Cases in South Asia

Country	Key Figure	Scandal Amount (USD)	Year
India	Gautam Adani & Narendra Modi	\$250M (Bribery)	2023
Pakistan	Asif Ali Zardari	\$5B (Laundering)	2018
Bangladesh	Sheikh Hasina & Family	\$5B (Project Embezzlement)	2024



DISCUSSION

The findings of this study highlight the deeply embedded nature of political patronage in South Asia, demonstrating its significant role in shaping governance structures in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Rather than focusing on individual accountability, the research critically examines systemic flaws that enable patronage networks to thrive. The selection of recent high-profile cases underscores the relevance of political patronage in contemporary governance, as these cases remain subjects of judicial scrutiny or parliamentary debate. The theoretical framework of clientelism provided a structured lens through which the reciprocal exchange between political elites and their beneficiaries was analyzed. Clientelism, characterized by the exchange of goods, services, or favors for political loyalty, is intricately linked to political patronage, which involves the allocation of state resources to sustain political alliances. This interdependence facilitates a system in which access to resources is determined by political allegiance rather than merit, ultimately eroding institutional credibility and public trust (22,23). In comparing these findings with existing literature, a clear pattern emerges wherein patronage serves as a mechanism to consolidate political power at the expense of governance efficiency. Previous studies have established that patron-client relationships are particularly prevalent in regions where institutional oversight is weak and political

competition relies on resource distribution rather than policy innovation (12, 14). The study's findings align with this perspective, illustrating how state resources in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have been instrumentalized to reinforce clientelistic networks. The allocation of government contracts, public sector jobs, and economic benefits based on personal loyalty rather than meritocracy perpetuates cycles of dependency and obstructs efforts toward institutional reform. This sustains an environment where public officials are incentivized to serve political interests rather than societal needs, thereby weakening governance structures and accountability mechanisms (24).

The implications of these findings are substantial, as they underscore the systemic barriers to transparency and effective governance in South Asia. Patronage-driven political systems contribute to inefficiency by prioritizing short-term political gains over long-term institutional stability. The erosion of public trust in state institutions further exacerbates social inequality, as citizens increasingly rely on personal networks rather than formal governance mechanisms to access essential services. This dynamic perpetuates socio-economic disparities, hindering development efforts and reinforcing political polarization. The findings also indicate that political patronage not only undermines democratic processes but also creates resistance to anti-corruption initiatives, as those in power have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. The presence of institutions such as the Lokpal in India and the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) in Pakistan has done little to curb these practices, as their autonomy remains compromised by political influence (25,26). Despite its contributions, this study has certain limitations. The reliance on secondary data, including investigative reports, parliamentary records, and media coverage, presents challenges in verifying the objectivity of sources. While efforts were made to cross-reference information, the potential for political bias in journalistic investigations and governmental reports cannot be entirely eliminated. Additionally, the study focuses primarily on qualitative assessments, limiting its ability to quantify the economic impact of patronage-driven corruption. Future research could benefit from integrating economic modeling to estimate the financial losses incurred due to patronage and corruption. Expanding the scope of the research to include comparative case studies beyond South Asia could also provide broader insights into how different political systems address patronage, offering lessons for governance reforms (27-29).

Addressing political patronage requires comprehensive policy interventions that go beyond legal frameworks. Strengthening independent anti-corruption bodies by ensuring their operational autonomy is critical to dismantling patronage networks. The establishment of transparent campaign finance regulations could limit the influence of financial elites in politics, preventing state resources from being leveraged for electoral advantage. Additionally, socio-economic reforms that prioritize merit-based recruitment and equitable distribution of public resources would reduce citizens' reliance on political intermediaries. Civil society and independent media play a crucial role in holding power to account, but their effectiveness is contingent upon legal protections for journalists, whistleblowers, and activists. Ensuring the freedom of press and civic engagement would enhance transparency and foster a political culture that prioritizes governance over patronage. Without these systemic changes, political patronage will continue to undermine governance structures, hinder development, and perpetuate cycles of inequality in South Asia (30).

CONCLUSION

Political patronage, deeply rooted in historical governance structures, has continued to evolve and persist in post-colonial South Asia, shaping political dynamics and undermining institutional integrity. The findings of this study highlight how patronage networks systematically manipulate state resources, erode public trust, and obstruct transparent governance. While political leaders operate within formal institutions, the strategic allocation of jobs, contracts, and public funds based on loyalty rather than merit perpetuates corruption and weakens accountability mechanisms. This cycle not only reinforces systemic inefficiencies but also suppresses democratic progress, making reform efforts increasingly difficult. Addressing this issue requires strong institutional safeguards, independent oversight, and civic engagement to counteract the entrenched structures that sustain political favoritism. By exposing the mechanisms of patronage, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of governance failures and emphasizes the urgent need for policy-driven interventions that prioritize transparency, equity, and institutional integrity.

REFERENCES

1. Williams, G. (2003). Thomas Hobbes: Moral and Political Philosophy. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. <https://iep.utm.edu/hobmoral/>
2. Honeycutt, K. (2025, January 10). Machiavelli, Niccolò | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. <https://iep.utm.edu/machiave/>
3. Pareto, V. (1935). *The mind and society: A treatise on general sociology* (A. Bongiorno & A. Livingston, Trans.). New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & Co. (Original work published 1916). Relevant content: Volume III, sections on "circulation of elites." Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/ParetoTheMindAndSocietyVol4TheGeneralFormOfSociety/Pareto%20-%20The%20Mind%20and%20Society%20Vol%203%3B%20Sentiment%20in%20Thinking%20%28Theory%20of%20Derivations%29/page/n13/mode/2up>
4. Mosca, G. (1939). *The ruling class* (A. Livingston, Trans.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. (Original work published 1896). Relevant content: Chapter I, "Political Science." Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.190559/page/n39/mode/2up?view=theater>
5. Dahl, R. A. (1956). *A preface to democratic theory*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Relevant content: Chapter 4, "Pluralist Democracy," pp. 124–150. Retrieved from <https://virtualmmx.ddns.net/gbooks/APrefacetoDemocraticTheory,ExpandedEdition.pdf>
6. Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1848). *The Communist Manifesto*. London, England: Communist League. Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/>
7. Weber, M. (1922). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology* (G. Roth & C. Wittich, Eds. & Trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Relevant content: Chapter 11, "Bureaucracy," pp. 956–1005. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/MaxWeberEconomyAndSociety/page/n491/mode/2up>
8. Fukuyama, F. (2014). *Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy*. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Relevant content: Chapter 38, "Political Decay," pp. 548–551.
9. Habib, I. (1999). *The agrarian system of Mughal India (1526–1707)* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. Zamindari System: Chapter, "The Zamindar," pp. 136–188.
10. Bose, S., & Jalal, A. (2011). *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy* (3rd ed.). Routledge. "The First Century of British Rule, 1757–1857," pp. 67–75.
11. Chandra, B. (1984). *Communalism in Modern India*. Published by V.K. Fandtt, Secretary, National Council of Educational Research and Training, Sri Aurobindo Marg, New Delhi, and printed at India Offset Press, A-1 Mayapuri, New Delhi. pp. 159
12. Piliavsky, A. (Ed.). (2014). *Patronage as Politics in South Asia*. Cambridge University Press. Relevant content: Chapter: "Democracy as Patronage"
13. Alavi, H. (1972). The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh. *New Left Review*, (74), 59–81.
14. Jahan, R. (2014). *Political Parties in Bangladesh*. CPD-CMI Working Paper Series, 8.
15. Hindenburg Research. (2023, January 25). *Adani Group: How The World's 3rd Richest Man Is Pulling The Largest Con In Corporate History*. Hindenburg Research. <https://hindenburgresearch.com/adani/>
16. Balan, P., & Kalpesh Damor. (2014, April 25). *Adani Group got land at cheapest rates in Modi's Gujarat*. @Bsindia; Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/adani-group-got-land-at-cheapest-rates-in-modi-s-gujarat-114042501228_1.html
17. Mishra, M. (2021, November 8). *Adani pays ₹2,440 crore to AAI to take possession of 6 airports*. The Economic Times; Economic Times. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/airlines/-aviation/adani-pays-2440-crore-to-aai-to-take-possession-of-6-airports/articleshow/87575511.cms?from=mdr>
18. Sheikh, W. A. (2018, December 25). *29 fake accounts used to launder Rs42bn, JIT tells apex court*. DAWN.COM. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1453414>
19. The Newspaper's Staff Reporter. (2024, April 24). *Zardari pleads presidential immunity in fake accounts case*. DAWN.COM. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1829232>
20. 24, F. (2024, December 23). *Bangladesh launches \$5bn graft probe into Hasina's family*. France 24; FRANCE 24. <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241223-bangladesh-launches-5bn-graft-probe-into-hasina-s-family>
21. Curtis, J. (2024, October 4). *Bangladesh: The fall of the Hasina Government*. House of Commons Library. <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10096/>

22. Bureau, E. (2023, February 8). Several remarks of Rahul Gandhi expunged. *The Economic Times*; *Economic Times*. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/several-remarks-of-rahul-gandhi-expunged/articleshow/97747401.cms?from=mdr>
23. Business today. (2023, June 30). These were India's 10 highest tax-paying business groups in FY23. *Business Today*. <https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/corporate/story/these-were-indias-10-highest-tax-paying-business-groups-in-fy23-387779-2023-06-30>
24. Collins. (2019, September 11). Power struggle definition and meaning | Collins English Dictionary. *Collinsdictionary.com*. <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/power-struggle>
25. ET Online. (2023, February 8). TMC MP Mahua Moitra's "unparliamentary language" causes ruckus in Lok Sabha. *The Economic Times*; *Economic Times*. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/tmc-mp-mahua-moitra-unparliamentary-language-causes-ruckus-in-lok-sabha/articleshow/97720584.cms?from=mdr>
26. Express Web Desk. (2022, September 16). Gautam Adani Becomes 2nd Richest Man: Gautam Adani edges past Bernard Arnault to become world's second richest. *The Indian Express*. <https://indianexpress.com/article/business/gautam-adani-second-most-richest-billionaire-forbes-list-bernard-arnault-jeff-bezos-elon-musk-8154481/>
27. Moneycontrol. (2025). Adani Enterprises Profit & Loss account. *Moneycontrol.com*. <https://www.moneycontrol.com/mccode/loginConsent.php?url=https://www.moneycontrol.com/financials/adanienterprises/profit-lossVI/ae13>
28. Our Correspondent. (2021, July 3). NAB recovered Rs33b in cases involving Zardari Fawad. *The Express Tribune*. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2308644/nab-recovered-rs33b-in-cases-involving-zardari-fawad>
29. Oxford learners . (2025). patronage noun - Definition, pictures, pronunciation and usage notes | Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.com. *Oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com*. <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/patronage?q=patronagea>
30. The Economics Times. (2024, November 21). TMC MP questions "involvement" of BJP government over bribery charges against Adani. *The Economic Times*; *Economic Times*. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/tmc-mp-questions-involvement-of-bjp-government-over-bribery-charges-against-adani/articleshow/115521659.cms?from=mdr>