CHALLENGES TO ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS IN SOUTH ASIA: POLITICAL PATRONAGE AS AN OBSTACLE TO TRANSPARENT GOVERNANCE IN INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND BANGLADESH

Abstract

Background: Political patronage, characterized by the allocation of state resources, jobs, and contracts in exchange for political loyalty, remains a persistent challenge to governance in South Asia. Rooted in historical governance structures, patronage has evolved from the Mughal-era Mansabdari system to a tool of electoral manipulation in modern political frameworks. In India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, clientelistic networks undermine institutional integrity, erode public trust, and facilitate large-scale corruption. Despite anti-corruption measures, patronage remains a dominant force in political decision-making, obstructing governance reforms and democratic accountability.

Objective: This study aims to examine the mechanisms of political patronage in South Asia, assess its impact on governance and corruption, and analyze contemporary high-profile cases to illustrate its entrenched role in political systems.

Methods: A qualitative research design was employed, utilizing secondary data from investigative reports, parliamentary records, judicial proceedings, and academic literature. The study incorporated a theoretical framework of clientelism to interpret the findings. Case selection criteria included the prominence of corruption cases, financial magnitude, and documented political involvement. Three case studies were analyzed: the Adani scandal (India, $250M bribe allegations), the fake accounts money laundering case (Pakistan, $5B misappropriation), and the Rooppur Nuclear Power Project fraud (Bangladesh, $5B embezzlement). Thematic analysis was conducted to identify key trends in patronage networks, corruption mechanisms, and governance failures.

Results: The findings trace political patronage from historical origins to contemporary governance structures, revealing a systematic pattern of favoritism and financial mismanagement. In India, allegations indicate that the Adani Group acquired 1,552 hectares of public land at undervalued prices and won six major airport privatization bids under politically favorable conditions. In Pakistan, judicial investigations exposed 29 fraudulent accounts linked to high-ranking officials, revealing $10.2B in suspicious transactions. In Bangladesh, corruption allegations against the former prime minister involved $5B in financial irregularities, leading to political instability and her eventual resignation. These findings underscore how patronage weakens institutional autonomy, fuels political instability, and obstructs economic progress.

Conclusion: Political patronage remains deeply embedded in South Asia’s governance systems, obstructing transparency, meritocracy, and institutional reform. Addressing this issue requires the strengthening of independent anti-corruption bodies, enhanced transparency in campaign financing, and comprehensive socio-economic reforms. Civil society and media oversight must be reinforced to expose and counteract patron-client networks, ensuring democratic accountability and sustainable governance.